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MALICIOUS PROSECUTION IN FLORIDA
LEONARD M. RIVKIND *
Who steals my purse steals trash; 'tis something, nothing;
tTwas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands;
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him,
And makes me poor indeed. **
INTRODUCTION
Scope. The emphasis in this article is on the Florida law regarding
malicious prosecution. No attempt has been made to exhaust the field in
general. Some reference is made to the law in other jurisdictions and to the
scholars only to clarify or emphasize a point under discussion, or perhaps,
just because the author believed the statement to be novel or interesting.
This article is concerned with actions based upon criminal proceedings,
not wrongful civil proceedings. Although generally governed by the same
rules, there are some differences.t
Distinguished Malicious prosecution should be distinguished from de-
famation, abuse of process, and false imprisonment.
Three reasons have been advanced why malicious prosecution was not
included as a branch of the law of defamation.2 First, malicious prosecu-
tion preceded defamation as a cause of action; second, the strict liability
of defamation seemed too drastic; third, since malicious prosecution covers
a broader field than mere harm to reputation, the interests protected are not
identical.3
*B.B.A. 1950, University of Miami; L.L.B. 1954, University of-Miami; Former
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**IWM. SHAKESPEARE.OTHELLO, THE MOOR OF VENICE, Act III, sc. 1II (1602).
1. PROSSER ON TORTS 97 (1941). See RESTATEMRNT, TORTS 674 (C).
For an action based upon wrongful civil proceedings see Tatum Bros. Real Estate
& Inv. Co. v. Watson, 92 Fla. 278, 109 So. 623 (1926); Fisher v. Payne, 93 Fla.
1085, 113 So. 378 (1927) (action based upon lunacy proceeding).
2. PROSSER ON TORTS 96 (1941)
3. tbid.
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Abuse of process occurs when one misuses process justified in itself
for an end other than that which it was designed to accomplish. Probable
cause and termination in the plaintiff's favor are not in issue as is the
case in malicious prosecution.'
False imprisonment differs from malicious prosecution in that the former
is concerned with the irregularity of legal process.If there is valid pro-
cess, the arrest is not "false" and the action must be for malicious prose-
cution,S
In Tobey v. Orr," the defendant had made an affidavit charging plaintiff
with polluting water. The Florida Supreme Court said the action for mali-
cious prosecution lies although it appears that no crime known to law is
charged or even where the affidavit fails to allege facts constituting a
crime. The rationale is that the action is for injury to reputation and ex-
penses incurred in defense, and not for the danger of punishment to which a
man is subjected.
The dissenting opinion, contended that false imprisonment was the pro-
per remedy since the process on which the arrest was made was void.
Policy Consideration. Malicious prosecution suits do not curry favor
with the courts while they appear to attract the sympathy of jurors. An
awareness of underlying and conflicting policy is essential to justify the
somewhat rigorous rules that place a heavy burden upon the plaintiff in a
suit for malicious prosecution. The policy conflict is in the encouragement
of enforcement of criminal laws versus the protection of individuals from
oppression.'
Justice Hobson has stated:,
We are not unaware of the fact that suits bottomed upon malicious
prosecution generally find little favor with the courts.
Earlier, Justice Terrell observed:' 0
*.. An action for malicious prosecution... should not be unduly
restricted; at the same time it should be rigidly safeguardedand
not be permitted, except when the circumstances meet the test.
Otherwise the adjudication of controverted issues will fail of their
purpose and degenerate into a series of reprisals and counter re-
prisals and the litigants, like the fabled Kilkenny cats, will have
consumed each other.
4. PROSSER ON TORTS 98(1941).
5. PROSSER ON TORTS 96 (1941). See Kress v. Powell, 132 Fla. 471, 180 So.
757 (1938). (The court pointed out that if imprisonment is under legal authority it
may be malicious but it cannot be false; that void process will not constitute legal
authority).
6. 92 Fla. 964, 111 So. 110 (1926).
7. Id. at 112
8. See RESTATEMENT, TORTS C. 29, Intoduction.
9. Giass v. Parrish, 51 So.2d 717, 721 (Fla. 1951).
10. Levy v. Adams, 140 Fla. 515, 192 So. 177, 179 (1939).
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A statement evidencing caution is found in Jaffe v. Stone," a Califorpia
case:
(The rule of public policy under which actions for malicious pro-
secution are treated with disfavor ought not to be pressed) to the
extrem of practical nullification of the tort liability, and thecon-
sequent defeat of the other important policy which underlies it of
protecting the individual from the danmge caused by unjustifiable
prosecution.
Which statement you would advance as the overriding policy depends, I
suppose, upon which side of the fence you are on.
ELEMENTS
The following elements must all be present in order to give rise to a
cause of action in malicious prosecution: 12
(1) The commencement or continuance of an original criminal proceeding.
(2) Legal causation by the present defendant against plaintiff, who was
defendant in the original proceedings.
(3) A bona fide termination of the original criminal proceeding in favor of
the present plaintiff.
(4) The absence of probable cause for such proceedings.
(5) The presence of malice therein.
(6) Damages conforming to legal standards resulting to plaintiff.
The burden of proving the preceding elements in the malicious prosecu-
tion suiti) is on the plaintiff.
Commencement or Continuance. Generally, a criminal proceeding has
commenced upon the issuance of a warrant, indictment returned, or infor-
mation filed.- A mere complaint to the authorities or presenting evidence
to the grand jury which refuses to indict will not support the action." A
person is liable for influencing or inducing another, by pressure or false in-
formation known to be false, to commence the criminal proceeding, but not
for merely giving advice."6 Furthermore, if a person presses for a convic-
tion after discovering a lack of probable cause, such person will be liable
for harm caused by such a continuance, provided, of course, that the pro-
ceeding ultimately terminates in favor of the accused. 1"
In Kress v. Powell" the Florida Supreme Court held that the summoning
of a policeun and inforning him that plaintiff had attempted to pass a
11. Jafte v. Stone, 18 Cal. 2d 146, 114 P.2d 335, 343 (1941i.
12. Glass v. Panish, 51 So.2d 717 (Fla. 1951); Ward v. Alien, 152 Fla. 82, 11
So.2d 193 (1943); Duval Jewelry Co. v. Smith, 102 Fla. 717, 136 So. 878 (1931).
13. Duval Jewelry Co. v. Smith, 102 Fla. 717, 136 So. 878 (1931).
14. RSATRMENT, TORTS 654. See also, PROSSRR ON TORTS 96 (1941).
15. PROSS~a ON TORTS 96 (1941).
16. RESTATEMENT, TORTS C. 29, Itro&*ctios.
17. RESTATEMENT, TORTS 655.
is. 132 Fla. 471, 180 So. 757 (1938)
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counterfeit bill was not the commencement of a judicial proceeding. This
decision follows the general rule,supra.
Termination. In Hower v. Lewton- the defendant was sued for charging
plaintiff with perjury. In the original proceeding the grand jury failed to
return an indictment and plaintiff was discharged. The Florida Supreme
Court correctly held that there was a termination in plaintiff's favor to sap-
port the present action. It should be noted in this regard that failure of the
grand jury to indict which is not followed by discharge cannot serve as a
foundation for the action."° Entry of a nolle prosequi is a favorable term-
ination.2i The same is true of a discharge on hearing.' It is enough that
the proceeding is terminated so that it cannot be revived.-
The termination must be bona fide. Where the charges are withdrawn by
reason of a compromise with the accused, there is no favorable termination
to support the action.' 4
While the accused in the original criminal proceeding must be proven
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, it is generally held that the guilt of the
accused may be retried in the malicious prosecution suit and shown by a
preponderance of the evidence, in order to defeat recovery."
Probable Cause. As has been stated previously, the plaintiff must prove,
inter alia, the absence of probable cause. Although malice may be implied
from want of probable cause, want of probable cause cannot be inferred
from malice.,, What is "probable cause" has been the subject of much
litigation. Blandly stated, there is probable cause if a reasonable man
would have believed and acted under the circumstances as the defendant
did. The Supreme Court of Florida has stated it another way:"
Probable cause consists of such reasons as are sufficient to
create a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed, and
that the party charged was connected therewith.
These "reasonable man" definitions never seem to solve your particular
problem. More useful and interesting, perhaps, would be an examination of
the Florida and fifth circuit cases involving the question of probable cause.
Anderson v. Bryson" held that charging plaintiff with violation, of the
bogus check statute where he gave post-dated checks together with a prom-
ise to have funds to cover it in the future did not constitute probable cause.
In another case," the plaintiff had purchased a ring from the defendant
under a retain title contract. The first installment was not paid at maturity
and plaintiff absconded. When apprehended, plaintiff was charged with dis-
19. 18 Fia. 328 (1881).
20. PROSSER ON TORTS 96(1941).
21. Tobey v. Orr, 92 Fla. 964, 111 So. 110 (1926).
22. Anderson v. Bryson, 94 Fla. 1165, 115 So. 505 (1927).
23. PROSSER ON TORTS 96 (1941).
24. Ibid.
25. PROSSER ON TORTS 96 (1941); RESTATEMENT, TORTS 657.
26. Ward v. Allen, 152 Fla. 82, 11 So.2d 193 (1943); Duval Jewelry Co. v. Smith,
102 Fla. 717, 136 So. 878 (1931).
27. Florida East Coast R. Co. v. Groves, 55 Fla. 436, 46 So. 294, 296 (1908).
28. 94 Fla. 1165, 115 So. 505 (1927).
29. Duval Jewelry Co. v. Smith, 102 Fla. 717, 136 So. 878 (1931).
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posing of the ring contrary to the retain title statute. He produced the ring
in court and defendant had the charge dismissed. On these facts, the court
said there was a complete failure to show lack of probable cause and the
lower court erred in derying defendant's motion for a directed verdict. (The
jury had awarded $4,316.40 to plaintiff).
In a case'0 where a sheriff had filed an affidavit against plaintiff and
and subsequently an information was filed against plaintiff by the state at-
torney, the court held that the fact two officials filed tended to show prob-
able cause.
In Good Holding Co. v. Boswells t the defendant husband ran the bar in
the defendant hotel for the defendant owner, his wife. The defendant hus-
band believed employees of the bar were stealing from the receipts. Plain-
tiff was hired as a checker and subsequently charged with embezzlement,
She was acquitted for failure of proof. The court determined that the fact
defendant was reimbursed by an insurance company for loss from employee
thefts does not preclude the jury from finding want of probable cause. (The
verdict was for $7,000).
There are an abundance of cases establishing that probable cause is
shown where the defendant acted upon advice of competent counsel after a
full and fair disclosure."1 This defense has been well stated in Duval
Jewelry Co. v. Smith:-
• • • Acting on the advice of counsel is complete defense... where
it appears that the prosecution was instituted in reliance in good
faith on such advice, given after a full and fair statement to the
attorney of all the facts, and the fact that the attorney's advice
was unsound or erroneous will not affect the result.
An attorney who initiates charges must rely on the advice of another at-
torney experienced in the field of criminal law in order to enter the plea of
"advice of counsel. '"S
It is well to remember that probable cause is a mixed question of law and
of fact. On undisputed facts, it is a question of law for the courts. Where
the evidence is conflicting the court will instruct the jury as to what facts
will constitute probable cause or want of it."
According to one authority" a subsequent reversal does not show lack of
probable cause and the original conviction is still conclusive on finding of
probable cause.
30. Vard v. Allen, 152 Fla. 82, 11 So.2u 193 (1943).
31. 173 F.2d 395 (5th C1R.),cert. denied, 338 U.S. 815 (1949).
32. Glass v. Parrish, 51 So.2d 717 (Fla. 1951); Seaboard Oil Co. v. Cunningham,51 F.2d 321 (5th Cir.) (holding advice of counisel is good defense whether there be
probable cause or not), cert. denied 284 U.S. 657 (1931); Lewton v. Hower, 35 Fla.58, 16 So. 616 (1895); see Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. 'ard, 92 Fla. 526, 109 So,
452 (1926).
33. 102 Fla. 717, 136 So. 878, 880 (1931).
34. tlucki Lumber Co. v. Atlantic Lumber, 121 Fed. 233 (Sth Cit. 1903);
RESTATEMENT, TORTS 662.
35. Seaboard Oil Co. v. Cunningham, 51 F.2d 321 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S.
657 (1931).
36. RESTATEMENT. F'oRTS 667..
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Malice. The plaintiff must prove the original proceedings were. instituted
maliciously.-s Malice is determined by the jury" and may be inferred from
want of probable cause." Malice is usually found where the defendant's
purpose in instituting the criminal proceeding was other than the social one
of bringing the offender to justice;"° for example, to coerce the payment of
a civil debt. 4 The Restatement2 says improper purpose is shown where
there is a lack of belief in guilt; where hostility or ill will is the primary
purpose; where private advantage is sought even though such advantage
might have been obtained in civil proceedings.
In Maiborne v. Kuntz' the Florida Supreme Court said malice was shown
where the defendant testified falsely in the original criminal proceeding.
Damages. In theory there can be no recovery without proof of actual
damage but Prosser says that in practice this rule has been nullified by the
"benevolent fiction" that certain damages necessarily follow from the
wrongful prosecution and will be assumed by the law to exist without
proof."
Since malice is in issue in malicious prosecution suits, exemplary dam-
ages or "smart money" are recoverable." The personal wealth of the de-
fendant is admissable so that the jury may determine the amount of damages
that should be awarded in order to sufficiendy punish the defendant for his
willful act." An award.of $10,000 has been affirmed by the Florida Supreme
Court where the evidence established the defendant's worth at $250,000.4"
Damages are recoverable for injury to reputation, inconvenience, numili-
ation, mental pain and suffering, loss of employment and expenses incurred
in defending the wrongful prosecution."
There is a difference of opinion as to whether plaintiff may show his
good reputed character before it is attacked. Wigmore subscribes to the
view that his reputation is assumed to be good, and that he has therefore
no need to sustain it until it has been attacked."0
This interesting quote is found in Jones on Evidence:-
So far as the cause of action rests upon an injury to the character
or an insult to the person, compensatory damages may be in-
creased by proof of the wealth of plaintiff.. This is upon the
ground that wealth is an element which goes to make up his rank
37. See note 13 supra.
38. PROSSER ON TORTS 96(1941).
39. See note 26 supra.
40. PROSSER ON TORTS 96(1941).
41. Glass v. Parish, 51 So.2d 717 (Fla. 1951).
42. RESTATEMENT. T6RTS 668,
43. 56 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1952).
44; PROSSER ON TORTS 96 (1941).
45. Kress. v. Powell, 132 Fla. 471, 180 So. 757 (1938).
46. JONES ON EVIDENCE 159, 161 (4thsd.).
47. Mariborne v. Kuntz, 56 So.2d 720 (Fla. 19521.
48. RESTATEMENT. ToRTS 670, 671; PROSSER ON TORTS 96 (1941).
49. WIGMORE ON EvIDEtcE 76 3rd Ed.). To like effect, see JONES ON EVI.
DENCE 157. 158 (4th Ed.).
50. At 160 (4th e4.).
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and influence in society, and thereby renders the injury or insult
resulting from wrongful acts the greater. (Italics supplied).
The preceding statement appears to be based upon sound reasoning and
should be advanced to the courts in a suit for malicious prosecution.
In proving wealth of defendant for compensatory damages evidence should
relate to reputed wealth and standing, while in seeking punitive damages
the inquiry should be as to actual pecuniary ability.51
MISCELLANEOUS
Attorney's Liability. Prosecuting attorneys are generally protected by an
absolute privilege,"1 while private attorneys will subject themselves to
liability by joining in their client's improper purpose or by acting on their
own behalf."
A complete dissertation covering the private attorney's liability appears
in'Staley v. Turner,54 a Missouri case:
If an attorney join with his client in prosecuting a criminal charge
against another, not for the purpose of subserving public justice,
but in order to effect some-private purpose of the client, such a
prosecution is malicious; and, proceeding upon such a motive, the
attorney is bound equally with the client to see to it that there is
probable cause for the prosecution .... From the standpoint of the
law the position of the attorney is, in such a case, exactly the
same as that of the client; from the standpoint of sound morals, it
is infinitely worse, for he prostitutes the privileges which the
state has conferred upon him of appearing in its courts, and a
minister of justice .... He is learned in the law and knows the
ground whereon he stands. His client confides in him and obeys
his directions. He is the chief actor; and where, actuated by the
corrupt motive of effecting some private purpose of his client, he
institutes an unfounded criminal prosecution against an innocert
person, without a belief in the guilt of that person founded upon
reasonable evidence, public justice is not satisfied with holding
the client liable and exonerating him.
CONCLUSION
It is hoped that this article may prove helpful to the practitioner who has
not yet found it necessary to research the law regarding malicious prose-
cution but desires a cursory knowledge. At least the citations to authorities
and reference to the Florida cases should aid the researcher when called
5. JONES ON EVIDENCE 162 (4th ed.).51Anderson v. Rohrer, 3 F. Supp. 367 (S.D. Fla. 1933); PROSSER ON TORTS 96
(1941).
53. Ibid. See RESTATEMENT, TORTS c. 29, Introduction.
54. 21 Mo. App. 244 (1886).
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upon to examine further, some particular problem. There is an abundance of
material on this subject and the researcher should not encounter any diffi-
culty in finding a solution to his problem. Since the courts have been con-
sistent with previous case decisions and litde conflict exists among the
various jurisdictions, the task of the researcher is lessened.
Because of the policy consideration and the rules of evidence applicable
thereto, a malicious prosecution suit is not easily won. The most difficult
element to prove appears to be a want of probable cause. Once proved, the
jurors seem to grasp and apply the rule that permits an inference of malice.
Most of the cases examined reach a satisfactory result. A proper balance
between the two conflicting policies has been maintained.
A number of malicious prosecution suits could probably be avoided if
police officers abstained from searching for a law to cover the facts related
by the complainant in order that the latter may swear out a warrant, and by
suggesting that the irate citizen see an attorney. The citizen who acts
without advice of competent counsel, and who lodges serious charges a-
gainst his fellow man, and who fails in his proof, is deserving of the ad-
verse verdict in a suit for malicious prosecution.
